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NOTES
ADMIRALTY-SINGLE NEGLIGENT ACT OF LONGSHOREMAN CAUSING
INSTANTANEOUS INJURIES INSUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
UNSEAWORTHINESS
Plaintiff, a longshoreman employed by an independent steve-
doring company, was injured during loading operations when
a fellow longshoreman lowered a non-defective winch too
quickly. In answer to plaintiff's action based on unseaworthiness
to recover for these injuries, defendant moved for summary
judgment on the ground that a single negligent act by a fellow
longshoreman does not render a ship unseaworthy. The motion
was denied, but defendant was granted leave to take an inter-
locutory appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and directed that the
motion be granted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the single, isolated
negligent act of a longshoreman which causes injury instan-
taneously to a fellow longshoreman does not render a vessel
unseaworthy. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S. Ct.
514 (1971).
Although unseaworthiness was conceived as a seaman's
defense to disciplinary action for deserting a vessel,' it has
become a basis for holding a shipowner liable for personal
injuries and wrongful death of seamen. It imposes upon a ship-
owner the nondelegable duty2 of providing to seamen2 and long-
shoremen 4 a ship reasonably fit for her intended service.5 The
shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness has been extended to
injuries which do not occur on board his vessel if an unsea-
worthy condition of the ship in fact caused the harm.6 This
duty encompasses furnishing seamen who are equal in ability
1. Comment, 76 HARV. L. REv. 819 (1963); Comment, 21 RUTGERS L. REV.
322 (1967).
2. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
3. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Carlisle Packing Co.
v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
4. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
5. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960): "What has
been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish an accident-
free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and
appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is not per-
fection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every conceivable
storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably
suitable for her intended service."
6. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
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and temperament to average seamen.7 The Supreme Court has
meticulously endeavored to separate the unseaworthiness doc-
trine from common law concepts of negligence s emphasizing
that a shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness is a species of
liability without fault and is to be invoked regardless of whether
the shipowner is aware of the dangerous condition which ren-
ders the vessel unseaworthy.9
Since it is a dangerous condition which renders a vessel
unseaworthy, it is understandable that courts have been con-
fused as to when a longshoreman's negligent act creates an
unsafe condition rendering the vessel unseaworthy.10 The ques-
tion of whether the negligent acts of the ship's crew that cause
instantaneous injury to other seamen or longshoremen render
the vessel unseaworthy is yet to be determined. However, con-
sidering the liberal construction of the unseaworthiness doctrine
by the Supreme Court and that court's holding in Boudoin v.
Lykes Bros.," it seems that if faced with this question the Court
would probably hold that such acts render the vessel unsea-
worthy. In other words, when a crewman's negligent act causes
instantaneous injury, the negligent seaman will himself probably
be considered an unseaworthy condition.
Failure to extend like treatment to the negligent acts of
longshoremen requires reasoning that is inconsistent with un-
seaworthiness theory. For analytical purposes the negligent acts
of longshoremen can be divided into two categories. The first
would include acts that create unsafe conditions that subse-
quently cause injuries to seamen or longshoremen. It seems
that the courts have uniformly determined that since the sub-
sequent injury is caused by an unsafe condition, the unsea-
worthiness doctrine applies. 12 The second category of acts are
those that cause injury at the time they take place, or instan-
7. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
8. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
9. Id.
10. For excellent discussions of the "Act-Condition Dichotomy" see Com-
ments, 76 HARV. L. REV. 819 (1963), 21 RUTGERS L. RV. 322 (1967).
11. 348 U.S. 336 (1955). The specific situation in Boudoin concerned a
seaman with vicious proclivities who attacked a fellow seaman. The injured
seaman was allowed to recover on the basis of unseaworthiness.
12. In Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) the Supreme Court
held that the use of defective rope when reasonably fit rope was available
created an unseaworthy condition. A defective shackle was held to produce




taneously. The theoretical stumbling block to divorcing such
acts from unseaworthiness is the notion that the tort concept of
notice plays no role in a finding of unseaworthiness. 18 Thus, in
determining unseaworthiness, the time differential between the
act and subsequent injury should, theoretically, make no differ-
ence. Apparently working against this theoretical inconsistency is
the equally compelling notion that holding shipowners liable
for the isolated negligent acts of third persons over whom they
have no control is basically unfair. The shipowner has no voice
in the hiring practices of stevedoring companies, yet the latter's
services are essential to the normal conduct of the shipping
industry.14
The Supreme Court's position on whether longshoremen's
negligent acts causing injury instantaneously constitute unsea-
worthiness was clouded by its per curiam reversal in Mascuilli
v. United States.'5 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals had
upheld the district court's finding that the death of a longshore-
man was due solely to operational negligence of the stevedoring
crew and not the unseaworthiness of the vessel.16 The writ of
certiorari posed three questions: (1) Did a prior unseaworthy
condition come into play by the handling of the equipment by
the stevedores? (2) Did the negligent handling of proper equip-
ment itself create a dangerous condition rendering the vessel
unseaworthy? (3) Was the vessel unseaworthy because the long-
shoremen were not equal in disposition and seamanship to or-
dinary men in the calling? To these queries the Court replied
with a reversal without opinion, merely citing Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co.17 and Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser.'s If the
Court were answering the first question in the affirmative it
would seem that defective equipment created an unsafe condition
producing pro tanto unseaworthiness. Thus, the question of neg-
ligent acts causing instantaneous injury was not reached. How-
13. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
14. In the 1959 case of Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959),
the Supreme Court addressed the act-condition dichotomy problem. The
Court found that a longshoreman's negligent setting of a circuit breaker at
too high a load caused an unseaworthy condition even though the circuit
breaker as such was not defective. Thus, at this point of the doctrine's devel-
opment it might have been said that an unseaworthy condition would result
when a longshoreman's negligence created an unsafe condition that subse-
quently caused injury.
15. 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
16. Mascuilli v. United States, 358 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1966).
17. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
18. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
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ever, the second and third questions did direct themselves to
the instantaneous injury issue. An affirmative answer to the
second question-that a longshoreman's negligent handling of
proper equipment created an unseaworthy condition-would
necessarily compel a positive answer to the third. The shipowner
would be liable on the same basis as he would probably be for
crewmen'Q-negligent longshoremen would be unsafe conditions
in and of themselves. A discussion of the manner in which the
circuit courts have dealt with the instantaneous negligence
question both before and after Mascuilli will illustrate the sit-
uation facing the Supreme Court in Usner.
Prior to Mascuilli the Second Circuit had attempted to dis-
tinguish between acts which were part of a continuous course
of operations for which liability for unseaworthiness might be
imposed and those isolated acts of negligence which would be
regarded as negligence only.2 0 In making this distinction the
court relied upon the time during which the condition existed.
Such reliance upon the time factor was attacked as merely
a method of legally placing the shipowner on notice of the danger
so he could act to remove it. 2 1 The argument was that since
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.22 held notice not to be a prerequi-
site to a finding of unseaworthiness, time is irrelevant in deter-
mining whether a vessel is unseaworthy. 5 It is likely that the
Second Circuit injected the time element in an attempt to draw
a practicable delineation between an act and a condition. Con-
sidering the practical difficulties in trying to distinguish on
such a basis, it is easy to understand this circuit's interpretation
19. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
20. Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1956): "However, it
Is at times hard to say whether a defect In hull or gear that arises as a
momentary step or phase in the progress of work on board should be con-
sidered as an incident in a continous course of operation, which will fasten
liability upon the owner only in case it is negligent, or as an unfitness of the
ship that makes her pro tanto unseaworthy. . . . It would be futile to try
to draw any line between situations in which the defect is only an incident
in a continuous operation, and those in which some intermediate step is to
be taken as making the ship unseaworthy. Nevertheless, it is necessary to
separate the two situations, even though each case must turn on its particu-
lar circumstances. In the case at bar although the libellant and his compan-
ion . . .had been those who laid the wrong hatch cover over the 'pad-eye'
only a short time before he fell, we think that enough time had elapsed to
result in unseaworthiness."
21. See Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962)
(dissenting opinion).
22. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
23. Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752, 755 (2d Cir. 1962).
See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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of Mascuilli to mean that negligent handling of proper equipment
creates a dangerous condition constituting unseaworthiness.
2 4
Such an interpretation eliminated the bothersome time consider-
ation. Therefore, in the Second Circuit if a longshoreman injured
another by the negligent use of proper equipment, the vessel was
considered unseaworthy. 25
The Fourth Circuit, emphasizing the Supreme Court's deep
concern for the welfare of seamen and longshoremen, has fol-
lowed the Second Circuit's interpretation of Mascuili.26 How-
ever, the interpretation rendered may have extended the doctrine
too far. One case held that operational negligence was subsumed
under unseaworthiness so that a "trial court's instructions should
no longer attempt to distinguish between the two."' In support
of this extension it can be said that if operational negligence
renders a vessel instantaneously unseaworthy, there is theoret-
ically no basis for distinguishing between the two.2s In the same
decision, however, the court was hasty to add that every case of
operational negligence would not create liability under un-
seaworthiness. 29 Thus, again the lower courts reflected uneasiness
in attempting to differentiate between an act and a condition.
Although the practical difficulties in applying the time factor
are apparent, such a test does seem to be the best possible
determinant. However, the Supreme Court has prohibited its
consideration in unseaworthiness cases.1s An alternative would
be to examine the degree of negligence involved in the act, but
such an approach would necessitate such a reliance upon tort
concepts that the unseaworthiness doctrine might lose the sepa-
rate identity which the Supreme Court has commanded for it.,'
In the Ninth Circuit before Mascuilli there was no recogni-
tion of "instantaneous unseaworthiness."3 2 To find an unsea-
24. Alexander v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 382 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1967);
Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967).
25. Tarabocchia v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 417 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1969);
Cleary v. United States Lines Co., 411 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1969).
26. Lundy v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1970); Venable v.
AIS Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1968).
27. Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347, 351 (4th
Cir. 1968).
28. See notes 13, 23 supra and accompanying text.
29. Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347, 355-56
(4th Cir. 1968).
30. See notes 13, 23, 28 upra and accompanying text.
31. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S. Ct. 514 (1971); Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
32. Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Billeci v.
United States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
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worthy condition the court required proof of the existence of an
antecedent dangerous or unsafe condition as the result of an act
which had terminated.3 When confronted with Mascuilli, that
court adhered to its position that liability for unseaworthiness
does not attach if the act and resulting injury occur simul-
taneously.84 To justify its stand the court read the Mascuilli
decision as authority for the proposition that liability for unsea-
worthiness is produced by a longshoreman's negligence only
if the negligence operated to create an unsafe condition which
subsequently caused injury. As the Supreme Court in Mascuilli
did not reach the question of whether "instantaneous unsea-
worthiness" would be recognized, 5 the position of the Ninth
Circuit remained unchanged.
The Fifth Circuit has been steadfastly committed to the tenet
that a longshoreman's negligence that instantaneously caused
injury to a fellow longshoreman does not constitute unseaworthi-
ness, but is, in fact, a defense available to the shipowner in
an unseaworthiness action.8 6 This is not to imply that this
circuit found that unseaworthiness would never result from a
longshoreman's negligence, but that the longshoreman's act
itself would not constitute unseaworthiness, unless it created an
unseaworthy condition that subsequently caused injury. In find-
ing unseaworthiness as a result of negligence in one case87 the
Fifth Circuit fell into the same trap in which the other circuits
found themselves-the court held that an "appreciable length
of time" had passed which was sufficient to constitute an unsea-
worthy condition.3 8 Again the lower courts were wrestling with
the problem of finding a condition to justify a holding of unsea-
worthiness when the most logical gauge-time-was theoretically
unavailable to them. 9
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit reiterated its stand
on operational negligence, holding that Mascuilli was not intend-
ed to abolish the defense of operational negligence in deter-
33. See note 32 supra.
34. Tim v. American President Lines, Ltd., 409 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1969).
35. Id. at 391-92.
36. Reed v. M. V. Foylebank, 415 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1969); Duncan v.
Transeastern Shipping Corp., 413 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
Robichaux v. Kerr McGee Oil Indus., Inc., 376 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1967);
Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1967).
37. E.g., Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv., 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969).
38. Id. at 1032.
39. See notes 13, 23, 28, 30 supra and accompanying text.
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mining unseaworthiness. Citing two of its cases decided in the
same year as Mascuilli,40 the court held that longshoremen's
negligent acts that caused injury instantaneously did not render
the vessel unseaworthy where all equipment and appurtenances
aboard were seaworthy.41
In a brief opinion the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit.42 The Court once again emphasized the fact that the
viability of the unseaworthiness doctrine depends in large part
upon its complete separation from liability based on negligence;
since unseaworthiness is a condition, how it comes into being
is quite irrelevant to the shipowner's liability for personal
injuries resulting therefrom. 48 As there was no question as to
the fitness of the equipment involved in the operation 44 and no
member of the ship's crew was involved,45 it was stated that it
was not the condition of the ship, her appurtenances, her cargo,
or her crew, but rather the isolated, personal negligent act of a
fellow longshoreman that caused Usner's injuries instantane-
ously. Usner had relied upon Mascuilli and had contended that it
should control the case. This matter was disposed of in a
footnote by Justice Stewart,4 6 wherein the Court's ruling in
Mascuilli was made clear. The Mahnich and Crumady cases
cited in Mascuilli dealt with defective equipment and the Court
there had answered the first question affirmatively 47-a prior
40. Robichaux v. Kerr McGee Oil Indus., Inc., 376 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1967);
Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1967).
41. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. v. Usner, 413 F.2d 984, 985-86 (5th Cir.
1969).
42. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S. Ct. 514 (1971).
43. Id. at 517: "A major burden of the Court's decision spelling out the
nature and scope of the cause of action for unseaworthiness has been insis-
tence upon the point that it Is a remedy separate from, independent of, and
additional to other claims against the shipowner, whether created by statute
or under general maritime law. More specifically, the Court has repeatedly
taken pains to point out that liability based upon unseaworthiness is wholly
distinct from liability based upon negligence. The reason, of course, is that
unseaworthiness is a condition, and how that condition came into being-
whether by negligence or otherwise-is quite irrelevant to the owner's liabil-
ity for personal injuries resulting from it."
44. Had there been a defect In the equipment, it is highly probable that
the circuit court would have been reversed. See notes 12-14 supra and accom-
panying text. See also Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S. Ct. 514
(1971) (dissenting opinions).
45. Were a crewman in the shipowner's employ involved in such a way as
to be liable for some negligent act, the shipowner may have been held liable
under the doctrine of Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) that
a ship is rendered unseaworthy by the shipowner's furnishing seamen not
equal in disposition and seamanship to ordinary men of the calling. See note
11 supra and accompanying text.
46. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S. Ct. 514, 518 n.18 (1971).
47. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
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unseaworthy condition had been brought into play. Thus, since
the issues of defective equipment and unsafe conditions created
by negligent use of reasonably fit equipment were not before
the Court in Usner, it easily disposed of the petitioner's reliance
on Mascuilli.
The fact that there was nothing that could be termed an
existing unseaworthy condition also effectively rebuts the dis-
senters in Usner, who felt that Crumady could not be distin-
guished on its facts from Usner.48 In Crumady the setting of a
circuit breaker at too great a load was the negligent act that
created the unseaworthy condition that later caused injuries.
In Usner there existed no such condition, regardless of how
created, at the time the longshoreman's negligence caused the
petitioner's injuries.
In light of the conflict among the circuits concerning the
operational negligence theory it is regrettable that the Court
did not explain its position more fully. However, it is clear that
the proposition emerging from Usner is that a single negligent
act of a longshoreman which instantaneously causes injury to
a fellow longshoreman does not constitute unseaworthiness.
Therefore, the "instantaneous unseaworthiness" doctrine of the
Second and Fourth Circuits is no longer to be regarded as law; 49
the Fifth Circuit's refusal to allow recovery under unseaworthi-
ness for a longshoreman's operational negligence 0 is upheld; and
it seems that the approach of the Ninth Circuit regarding liability
for operational negligence by longshoremen 5' is adopted.
Unfortunately, this case is not the panacea for the ills
engendered by the unseaworthiness doctrine. Although it is
settled that negligent acts of longshoremen which cause immedi-
ate injury to their fellows do not constitute unseaworthiness per
se, there remain unanswered questions and logical difficulties
with the present case. For example, if a longshoreman were to
negligently drop a bucket of grease on the deck which another
longshoreman subsequently slipped on and was injured, would
48. Justice Douglas also stated his feeling that were it not for the recent
change in membership of the Court, the decision in Usner would have been
to reverse the court of appeals. Such a contention is better left to analysis
by behavioralists in the political science field and is beyond this writer's goal
of legal analysis of the instant case.
49. See notes 20-31 supra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
51. See notes 82-35 supra and accompanying text.
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the shipowner be liable under unseaworthiness? Since the injury
did not occur simultaneously with the act, it seems that an
unseaworthy condition existed which caused the injury. Ac-
cording to the Court in Usner, the shipowner is liable for an
unseaworthy condition regardless of how it came into being.5 2
Since the time factor is to be discounted,5 any injury that
occurs at any time after the act itself is caused by an unsafe
condition and, logically, unseaworthiness should be found.
In summary, it seems that in all cases concerning a long-
shoreman's negligent operation of "reasonably fit equipment,"
liability based on unseaworthiness would lie only if a fellow
longshoreman's injury resulted from contact with the danger
created by that act after the act has terminated. A fortiori, when
a longshoreman uses defective equipment, whether negligently
or not, and a fellow longshoreman is injured, it seems that the
injuries would result from an unseaworthy condition. The same
conclusion would logically follow even if no equipment were
involved, and the act might not be labeled negligent, so long as
the act has terminated and injury is attributed to conditions
created by that act. If a crewman were injured in the same
factual situations, an identical finding would be compelled since
the shipowner's liability for unseaworthy conditions does not
depend on how those conditions are created,54 but merely upon
the fact that they exist.
In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki55 the Supreme Court held
that the duty of seaworthiness extended to longshoremen because
they performed duties traditionally done by seamen. For pur-
poses of finding liability for unseaworthiness, then, a longshore-
man was reasoned to be a seaman. As discussed earlier, it
would seem that a negligent act by a seaman which instantane-
ously injures a fellow seaman or longshoreman would probably
prompt the Supreme Court to find the shipowner liable based
on unseaworthiness for providing a crew member not equal in
disposition or seamanship to ordinary men of the calling.5
Adding authority to this prediction is the fact that the Court in
Usner was apparently influenced by the fact that no member of
the ship's crew was involved in the operations which caused the
52. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 13, 20-24, 29-31, 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 43, 52 supra and accompanying text.
55. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
56. See notes 7, 11 supra and accompanying text.
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petitioner's injuries.57 This seems to indicate, then, that if a
crewman negligently injured a longshoreman instantaneously
even without bringing into play an antecedent condition, unsea-
worthiness would still be found, the condition being the negli-
gent seaman himself. The logical question then becomes why is
a longshoreman not a "seaman" at all times and for all purposes.
Surely if a longshoreman performs the duties traditionally
performed by seamen, the situation in Usner could be regarded
as one negligent "seaman"--an unseaworthy condition in him-
self-causing injury to another "seaman," and the shipowner
would be held liable under unseaworthiness. Such circuitous
logic is illustrative of the heretofore unrestrained reaches of
the unseaworthiness doctrine. It is submitted that the Court in
Usner was moved more by considerations of equitable treatment
for the shipowner who has no control over the competence of
stevedoress rather than by the technical requirements of its
frequently unwieldy doctrine of unseaworthiness. 59 However
limited its application might be, it is hoped that the decision in
Usner reflects a tendency toward a more practical approach to
the problem of unseaworthiness when longshoremen are in-
volved.
James Louis Williams, IV
PAROL EVIDENCE USED TO SHOW LACK OF AUTHENTICITY
NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY EXECUTORY PROCESS
Plaintiff petitioned for seizure of immovable property owned
by defendant to foreclose, via executory process, on a conven-
tional mortgage evidenced by notarial act in authentic form.
Defendant sought to enjoin the executory proceeding for insuffi-
57. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. However, to base a deci-
sion merely on the fact that a shipowner has no control over stevedores fur-
nished to load and unload his cargo would have meant the overruling of the
Court's prior cases holding such lack of control not to be a defense at the
shipowner's disposal in attempting to disprove unseaworthiness. In such
instances the shipowner does have an opportunity to obtain indemnification
from the stevedoring contractor.
59. Perhaps the Court looked further than the immediate liability of the
shipowner. Had Luckenbach Overseas Corp. been held liable in this case, it
could have sued Usner's employer for indemnity for its failure to perform
in a "workmanlike manner." Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1956). Thus, this decision may reflect a tendency to give limited
recognition to the heretofore circumvented protection given stevedoring com-
panies by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.
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